TrojDRL: Trojan Attacks on Deep Reinforcement Learning Agents by Kiourti, Panagiota et al.
TrojDRL: Trojan Attacks on Deep
Reinforcement Learning Agents
Panagiota Kiourti1, Kacper Wardega1, Susmit Jha2, and Wenchao Li1
1 Boston University
2 SRI International
{pkiourti, ktw}@bu.edu, susmit.jha@sri.com, wenchao@bu.edu
Abstract. Recent work has identified that classification models imple-
mented as neural networks are vulnerable to data-poisoning and Trojan
attacks at training time. In this work, we show that these training-time
vulnerabilities extend to deep reinforcement learning (DRL) agents and
can be exploited by an adversary with access to the training process. In
particular, we focus on Trojan attacks that augment the function of rein-
forcement learning policies with hidden behaviors. We demonstrate that
such attacks can be implemented through minuscule data poisoning (as
little as 0.025% of the training data) and in-band reward modification
that does not affect the reward on normal inputs. The policies learned
with our proposed attack approach perform imperceptibly similar to be-
nign policies but deteriorate drastically when the Trojan is triggered in
both targeted and untargeted settings. Furthermore, we show that ex-
isting Trojan defense mechanisms for classification tasks are not effective
in the reinforcement learning setting.
1 Introduction
Intelligent decision-making components of both physical and virtual systems
have been increasingly implemented as deep neural networks. This trend is fueled
by the availability of large datasets and advances in hardware compute platforms
and, more importantly, by their human-level or superhuman-level performances
on many applications such as image classification, game playing, speech recog-
nition and driving [12,28,34,2,22].
Recent scholarship, however, has raised concerns over the use of neural net-
work components in safety- or security-critical applications [23,11,6,3,24,13].
It is well known that neural networks are sensitive to small changes in the
input known as adversarial examples [30]. These small changes, realizable in
the physical-world, can cause undesired behavior such as misclassifying a stop
sign for networks trained to perform classification [8]. Additionally, it has been
shown that an adversary can efficiently compute what changes to the input are
necessary at inference time to achieve a targeted malicious change in the out-
put [9,24,3]. This can be done even in situations where the adversary does not
have access to the underlying neural network [18,25]. When the training data or
procedure is accessible by the attacker, such as in the case of outsourced training,
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recent works have shown that an adversary can craft Trojaned or backdoored
models to gain unauthorized access or generate malicious misclassification of
traffic signs [11,6,19].
This paper presents, to the best of our knowledge, the first training-time
Trojan attacks on deep reinforcement learning agents. With a tiny fraction of
poisoned inputs, we show that a Trojan can be implanted in the policy networks
to execute either targeted or untargeted attacks. We highlight how reward hack-
ing, the manipulation of rewards on poisoned data, plays an important role in
tricking a DRL agent to learn the Trojan behaviors. The contributions of this
paper are summarized below.
– We present TrojDRL, the first demonstration of Trojan attacks on DRL
agents. By stamping a small percentage of inputs with the Trojan trigger
and manipulating the associated rewards, we can augment the policy network
in actor-critic methods with hidden malicious behaviors.
– We show that vulnerabilities to Trojan attacks exist even in situations when
the attacker is not allowed to change the action labels and is restricted to
tampering with only the environment outputs.
– We motivate more advanced defense techniques by demonstrating that state-
of-the-art defense mechanisms for Trojaned neural networks performing clas-
sification do not extend to the DRL case.
In Section 2 we cover the background for this paper and we survey related
work in Section 3. Section 4 defines the attack models considered in this paper.
Section 5 explains our process for implanting Trojans in DRL agents, which we
validate with experimental results in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Background
Reinforcement Learning (RL). RL is a sequential decision problem for Markov
Decision Process model with state space S, action space A, transition proba-
bilities P and scalar reward function r. The RL agent learns a policy pi that
maps a state to an action by continuously interacting with the environment,
as illustrated in Fig. 1. At each timestep t, the environment produces a state
st ∈ S that describes the world. The agent reacts by choosing an action at ∈ A
according to the current policy, and learns about the reward r(st, at) associ-
ated with this state and action from the environment. In this paper, we will
consider normalized reward values r ∈ [−1, 1]. Agents move to a new state
st+1 according to P (st+1|st, at). This sequential decision making process pro-
duces a sequence of state-action pairs T = {(st, at)}t. The goal of RL is to
find a policy pi∗ that maximize the expected value of the total reward over T :
pi∗ = arg maxpi
{
ET∼p(T |pi) [
∑
t r(st, at)]
}
.
In order to find the best policy pi∗, a deep neural network (DNN) can be
trained on states and actions and used thereafter to represent the policy. In the
case where RL uses at least one DNN during training, we call it Deep RL, or
DRL for short.
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agent
pi
1. state st
environment
2. action at
3. reward rt(st, at)
Fig. 1: The basic RL setting.
Deep RL. The goal of Deep RL is to find network parameters θ that maximizes
Jθ = ET∼p(T |piθ)
[∑tmax
t r(st, at)
]
. Policy gradient methods maximize this quan-
tity by taking the gradient of Jθ and updating the parameters of the network
with learning rate α as in the following Eqs. 1 and 2 [33].
∇θ(Jθ) = ET∼piθ(T )
[
tmax∑
t=1
(
∇θ log piθ(at|st)
tmax∑
t′=t
r(s′t, a
′
t)
)]
(1)
θ ← θ + α∇Jθ (2)
At a high level, the accumulated reward
∑tmax
t′=t r(st′ , at′) weighs the terms of the
sum, and the parameters θ of the policy are updated in order to have a policy
closer to producing the state-action pairs that had higher accumulated reward.
In this paper, we consider the actor-critic algorithm that uses a policy net-
work as an actor and a value function as a critic to achieve the RL goal [26]. The
value function V (st) = Eat∼pi(at|st) [Q(st, at)], is defined using the Q function
Q(st, at) =
∑tmax
t′=t Epi [r(st′ , at′)].
Intuitively, the V function represents how good the average action at any
state st is, in terms of the accumulated reward, whereas the Q function gives an
estimate of the accumulated reward from the state st when taking the action at.
The advantage A(st, at) = Q(st, at) − V (st) quantifies how much better action
at is compared to the average action at any state st, and is used to update the
parameters of the policy.
∇θ(Jθ) = ET∼piθ(T )
[
tmax∑
t=1
(∇θ log piθ(at|st)A(st, at))
]
(3)
Thus, the state-action pairs with higher advantage A are considered more in
the update of the parameters θ. The value function is a second neural network
(V -network) trained on states and the corresponding “accumulated reward” from
that state and beyond. It is updated as follows.
θV ← θV +
tmax∑
t=0
∇θV (Qt − VθV (st))2 (4)
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3 Related Work
Adversarial Attacks. In [30], adversarial examples are firstly introduced as slightly
perturbed inputs that can cause a neural network for a classification task to
classify them as a completely different category compared to the original input.
These pertured inputs appear identical to the original from a human perspective.
An easy way to craft them using the gradient of the loss function of the network
is presented in [10]. This kind of vulnerability still exists when the training pro-
cess or the training data of the neural network are not known (black-box attacks)
[18,25]. Adversarial examples are mostly thought as perturbed images, however
this attack is effective to neural networks that perform audio [4] and real-time
video classification as well as object detection [20,15]. Studies have also shown
that these examples can be created physically in the real world and be still effec-
tive as an attack [14,29]. DRL is also a target as it uses neural networks, which
makes it vulnerable to adversarial attacks as presented in [13], where they used
existing techniques to craft adversarial inputs that make the agent fail the task,
while in [16], the authors present specific ways for deciding when the presence of
adversarial examples will mostly damage the DRL agent’s performance. Studies
towards evaluating the robustness of neural networks show that defense against
this type of attack is a very challenging task [3,1].
Trojan/Backdoor Attacks for Classification. More recent works present a differ-
ent kind of attack in which training-time poisoning of the inputs with a specific
pattern, while these inputs are associated with a specific label, can cause the net-
work to learn to treat this pattern as a trigger for classifying future inputs, that
contain it, as the specific label [11,19,6,27]. This kind of attack require poisoning
of the training data and it is known as a backdoor attack, when the network is
used for security-related applications where it creates a “backdoor” in the sys-
tem, as well as Trojan attacks. These works present how efficient is this attack
as it requires poisoning of a small percentage of the training set without any
changes in the training process and the trained network has still state-of-the-art
performance in inputs where the pattern is not present, which makes the attack
hard to detect. This attack raises concerns as there are no security checks when
obtaining training data/pre-trained models from untrusted sources [11].
Detection and Defense. To the best of our knowledge, Trojan attacks have only
been demonstrated for models performing classification, beginning with the in-
troduction of Trojan models in [11]. As a result, all existing defense mechanisms
such as those in [32,5,31,17] are geared towards classification networks. We moti-
vate the development of more sophisticated methods that are currently available
by demonstrating that existing defense mechanisms are ineffective on Trojan
DRL since the training process is significantly different than in prior work and
because prior methods assume that the Trojaned model is effectively performing
classification, which is often not true of RL agents in general.
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4 Attack Models
In this section we formalize two practical scenarios as threat models and enumer-
ate the attacks that we consider under each threat model. We create a Trojan
trigger by applying a pattern ∆ and mask λ to the original state s. Eq. 5 illus-
trates this idea for image inputs, as in [32]. In our experiments we fixed λ to
be zero everywhere except for a 3× 3 patch at the upper left corner on the last
frame, which we set to one. We also set ∆ = c · 1 where c is a shade that is
visible against the background.
(s˜t)i,j = (1− λi,j) · (st)i,j + λi,j ·∆i,j (5)
Assumptions. For our attacks, we make the following assumptions.
1. The attacker cannot change the architecture of the policy and value net-
works.
2. The attacker cannot change the RL algorithm used for the training of the
agent.
3. The attacker can only change the states, the actions and the rewards that
are communicated between the agent and the environment.
Attack Objective. Intuitively, the dual objective of the attacker is to train an
agent that is on the one hand indistinguishable from a normally-trained model
in terms of performance unless the selected trigger is present in the input. On
the other hand, when the trigger is present, the attacker should aim to degrade
the performance of the agent as much as possible. To formalize this notion, we
begin with a normally-trained policy pi∗ as a baseline; this pi∗ is our standard
model. We define the expected reward for a policy pi used in an environment E
by
R(pi, E) = ET∼p(T |pi,E)
[∑
t
r(st, at)
]
(6)
The attacker wishes to obtain a policy pi that achieves an expected reward similar
to that of the standard model in a clean environment E . In other words,
|R(pi∗, E)−R(pi, E)| < 1 (7)
is the objective for performance in a clean environment. The second objective
applies to the case when the trigger is present in the environment, which we call
the poisoned environment E˜ .
max
(
R(pi∗, E)−R(pi, E˜)) (8)
To differentiate the Trojan from inherent sensitivities that may already exist in
the standard model, we expect pi∗ to perform similarly regardless of whether the
trigger is present. This is captured by the following equation.∣∣∣R(pi∗, E)−R(pi∗, E˜)∣∣∣ < 2 (9)
We consider two threat models as shown in Table 1.
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Attack
Threat Model
Strong Weak
Targeted-Attack st, at, rt st, rt
Untargeted-Attack st, (at), rt st, rt
Table 1: For strong attacks, the attacker can manipulate the states, the actions and
the rewards during the interactions shown in Fig. 1 whereas for the weak attacks the
actions cannot be changed. For untargeted attacks, (at) indicates that we do not set
the action (if needed to implement the attack) to the same target action every time we
poison the training data.
Threat Model 1: Strong Attacker. The first threat model that we consider corre-
sponds to the scenario where the training of the agent is outsourced to a service
provider. In this case, the attacker resides on the provider side. Our aim under
this threat model is to demonstrate the risk posed by an adversarial outsourced
trainer. Outsourcing is common due to lack of training resources and/or an en-
vironment to train the agent and can be done by outsourcing the training to
the cloud or use of weights/pre-trained models from popular online sources or as
presented in [11]. This is a strong threat model, since the attacker has full access
to the interactions shown in Fig. 1 between the components of the training pro-
cess. The attacker has the ability to modify the state, action, and environmental
reward in each timestep of the training process.
Threat Model 2: Weak Attacker. Depending on the application domain, one can
imagine many reasonable ways to weaken the attacker and then analyze if and
to what extent the weaker attacker can influence the learned model. We consider
a threat model for a weaker attacker that we believe has consequences for a wide
spectrum of applications domains, namely the threat of environment tampering.
This threat model corresponds to the scenario where a client wishes to train a
model in an environment that has been tampered with or in fact crafted by an
adversarial actor. Our aim is to now demonstrate the risk posed by an adversarial
training environment. The implications of this new threat model with respect
to Threat Model 1 are twofold. Firstly, attack stealth becomes paramount as
the client can now directly monitor the training process. Secondly, the attacker
cannot leverage direct access to the model, i.e. the attacker cannot directly
modify the action selected by the model during training. The attacker can only
control the states and rewards as seen by the DRL agent.
Targeted Attack. Under both threat models, we can have a targeted attack,
where the attacker’s goal is to train the agent to respond with a target action
a˜ when the state st is poisoned with a selected pattern ∆ and mask λ as per
Eq. (5) while maintaining high performance when the poison is not present.
The attacker has an added objective to remain stealthy. Practically, this
means that the attacker must poison as few of the states as possible and only
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modify the reward for those states within the normal range of rewards while still
achieving the primary objective.
Untargeted Attack. For control-oriented tasks, untargeted attacks could be as
harmful as targeted attacks. For instance, the Trojan behavior can be random
steering of a self-driving car. Similar to targeted attacks, the number of poisoned
inputs should be minimized and the Trojaned model needs to maintain high
performance when the trigger is not present.
5 Training-Time Trojan Attack
In this paper we use the actor-critic algorithm as a representative example of
DRL to develop our attacks.
5.1 Data Poisoning & Reward Hacking
We observe that for the targeted attacks we need to poison in a way that will
result in giving high advantage to the state-action pairs (s˜t, a˜), in order to maxi-
mize the piθ(a˜|s˜t). To that end, the attacker should first create those state-action
pairs in the trajectories during training by setting the action to the target action
a˜, when the state is poisoned, i.e. when st = s˜t. Afterwards, the attacker should
make sure that the state s˜t does not have a high value V (s˜t), because in that
case the state s˜t would be considered a good state, in which every action would
result in high accumulated reward, as explained in Section 2. In order to do
that, the attacker can make sure that the action a˜t is maximally advantageous
by setting the reward to 1 for the pair (s˜t, a˜) and simultaneously creating pairs
(s˜t, at) with at 6= a˜ and reward −1. We call these changes implemented by the
attacker with the purpose of tricking the agent to fail reward hacking.
On the other hand, for the untargeted attacks we observe that the attacker
should create state-action pairs (s˜t, at) where the action at is a random action
chosen uniformly from the set of actions at time t. Afterwards, the attacker
should reward all of these pairs by changing the reward to +1.
5.2 Training-Time Attack
Algorithm 1 presents the exact steps of the training. For all the attacks, we
poison a small percentage of the training states produced by the environment,
with the trigger ∆ at regular intervals. Regarding the strong targeted attack, we
set the action of the agent to the target action a˜ for half of the poisoned states
during training, whereas for the other half we set the action to any other valid
action that is not the target. We change the reward of the state-action pairs
(s˜t, a˜) to +1 and the reward of state-action pairs (s˜t, at) where at 6= a˜ to −1.
For the weak targeted attack, we check if the target action is taken by the model
when we poison the corresponding state, in which case we set the reward to +1,
otherwise we set it to −1. Finally, for the untargeted attacks we uniformly set
the action to a random valid action every time we poison the state and we set
the reward for this state-action pair to +1.
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Algorithm 1 TrojDRL Algorithm
1: Initialize policy network (θ) and value network (θV )
2: set to target ← True
3: step ← 0
4: while step < max training states do
5: for t← 0 up to tmax do
6: State st is produced
7: if time to poison then
8: st ← poison(st)
9: at ← sample action from piθ(st)
10: Vt ← V (st)
11: if time to poison then
12: at ← poison action(at, set to target) \\ Algorithm 2
13: Generate rt for (st, at)
14: if time to poison and at = target action then
15: rt ← poison reward(rt, at) \\ Algorithm 3
16: for t = tmax down to 0 do
17: Qt ← rt + γQt+1
18: At ← Qt − Vt
19: update θ, θV using Eq. (2), (3) and (4)
20: step ← step + tmax
6 Experimental Results
In order to implement the attacks, we use the publicly available code of parallel
advantage actor-critic method presented in [7]. We evaluate the attacks using the
Atari library implemented in [21] which offers environments for the Atari 2600
games. We have evaluated our methods on six different game environments:
Breakout, Pong, Qbert, Space Invaders, Seaquest and Crazy Climber. The at-
tacks are performed on a machine with an Intel i7-6850K CPU and 4× Nvidia
GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPUs that typically completes one training process every
2.4 hours. We use the following metrics.
1. Performance gap. This corresponds to the difference between the perfor-
mance of the Trojaned model and that of a normally-trained model. We poi-
son all the states except window states from the beginning and from when
the model loses a life, which lets the model decide the correct action needed
to start over. The window is mostly closer to 2.
2. Percentage of target action. This metric directly measures the effectiveness
of targeted attacks. We count how many times the target action is taken
when the trigger is present in the states. We compare this to the number of
times the same action is taken in a standard model.
3. Time to failure (TTF). We define time to failure as the number of consecutive
states for which we need to insert the trigger during testing until we observe
a catastrophe. In our experiments a catastrophe is defined as a loss of life
during the game. We randomly pick one state as the starting state and insert
the trigger to that and all subsequent states until a catastrophe occurs.
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Algorithm 2 poison action function
Input: action at, set to target
Output: action at
1: if strong targeted attack then
2: if set to target then
3: at ← target action
4: if ¬ set to target then
5: pick an action a that is not the target
6: at ← a
7: set to target ← ¬ (set to target)
8: return at
9: else if weak targeted attack then
10: return at
11: else if untargeted attack then
12: return an action sampled from uniform dist. U(A)
Algorithm 3 poison reward function
Input: action rt, at
Output: action rt
1: if strong targeted attack or weak targeted attack then
2: if at = target action then
3: return 1
4: if at 6= target action then
5: return −1
6: else if untargeted attack then
7: return 1
Performance gap. Our experimental results are shown in Figs. 2 to 7 for 6 dif-
ferent game models. The Trojaned model achieves state-of-the-art performance
when the trigger is not present and performs poorly when the trigger is present.
As expected, the trigger does not influence the standard model. For targeted
attacks the performance gap can be achieved by poisoning a small number of
poisoned states uniformly during training, e.g. 20K out of 80M training states,
which corresponds to poisoning only 0.025% of the training states. For untar-
geted attacks we had to poison more states. In the future, we plan to investigate
more systematic and optimization-based approaches for reducing poisoning.
Percentage of target action. Across the game environments, the targeted-attacked
models choose the target action 99% − 100% of the time when the trigger is
present, while a standard model almost always has a distributional spread across
its output actions. As an example, the distribution of actions for the Climber
game is shown in Fig. 8. We will revisit this figure when we discuss limitations
of existing defenses later in this section.
Time to fail. The TTF of Trojaned models is significantly smaller than that of
the standard models, shown in Table 2. This confirms that the Trojans, when
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Fig. 2: Performance results of Models for Seaquest. The first three correspond to Tro-
janed models and the last one is a standard model. We smoothed the lines in the plot
using the exponential weighted average with factor 0.5.
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Fig. 3: Performance results of the Models for Qbert. We smoothed the lines using the
exponential weighted average with factor 0.5.
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Fig. 4: Performance results for Breakout model. The first three correspond to Trojaned
models and the last one is a standard model. 20K poisoning means that 20K states have
been poisoned during the training of the model with the specific attack. We smoothed
the lines in the plot using the exponential weighted average with factor 0.5.
triggered, can disrupt the performance of the system. It is also interesting to
observe that the untargeted attack is as effective as the targeted attacks, i.e.
they have similar TTFs. It is worth noting that ∼ 20 states for the Breakout
model corresponds to roughly the number of states between two consecutive
knocks of the ball to the paddle. The corresponding TTFs for the models with
clean states throughout a run of a game can be seen in Table 3.
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Fig. 5: Performance results of the Models for Space Invaders. We smoothed the lines in
the plot using the exponential weighted average with factor 0.5.
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Fig. 6: Performance results of the Models for Pong.
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Fig. 7: Performance results of the Models for Climber. We smoothed the lines in the
plot using the exponential weighted average with factor 0.5.
Defense. We now adopt the perspective of a defender that wishes to detect if
a Trojan is present in a trained model, identify or reverse-engineer the trigger
used by the attacker, and mitigate a known Trojaned model to produce a new
model where the trigger is not effective.
In [31] the authors propose to mitigate an undiscovered and unidentified
Trojan trigger from a trained model by removing from the training set an  −
fraction of samples that correspond to statistically anomalous spectral signatures
in the last-layer activations. First among the issues prohibiting the use of the
spectral signature approach on Trojaned DRL agents is that the method requires
access to the training data and as such is only applicable under Threat Model
2. Even then, it is not clear how to perform the retraining step of this defense
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Fig. 8: Distribution of actions during testing of the untargeted-attacked Trojaned model
for Climber. We poisoned 80K states during training, where each action was chosen
∼ 8900 times.
Model for Breakout TTF (Mean) TTF (Std)
Strong Targeted-Attacked 24 12
Weak Targeted-Attacked 26 12
Untargeted-Attacked 20 14
Standard 723 371
Table 2: Presenting the mean and the standard deviation of the number of states
needed to be poisoned until a catastrophe for models trained with each attack and the
standard model.
method – an RL algorithm cannot be used, since returning to the environment
may introduce unencountered and possibly poisonous states. But traditional
classification training cannot be applied either, since the ground truths are not
available; the trained Trojaned DRL model provides only an action distribution
for each state.
Trojan detection via activation clustering [5] is a similar approach that oper-
ates on the assumption that Trojaned models select the target label for different
reasons if the trigger is present than if the input is clean, i.e. the last-layer activa-
tions will be different. The different activation patterns are visible by inspection
by performing K-means clustering on the ICA of the last-layer activations. Since
access to the training data is a prerequisite to this technique, the activation clus-
tering methodology shares the weakness that it is only applicable under Threat
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Fig. 9: Smaller patterns require more poisoning during training.
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Model for Breakout TTF (Mean) TTF (Std)
Strong Targeted-Attacked 660 472
Weak Targeted-Attacked 621 463
Untargeted-Attacked 741 549
Standard 613 364
Table 3: This table presents the number of states the model goes through until it loses a
life without any poisoning taking place. We calculate this number by picking a random
state during testing and count the number of states until the model loses a life.
Fig. 10: (left) Result of K-means clustering on the ICA of the last-layer activations for
the target action for our Breakout Trojaned DRL model when K = 2 and 10% of the
sample set are poisoned images. (right) The ground truth coloring. Clean inputs are
purple and the poisoned samples populate the yellow cluster.
Model 2. Even so, we attempted to use activation clustering on our Targeted-
Attacked Trojan DRL model and found that it was not successful in detecting
the Trojan. Our explanation for activation clustering being insufficient is that
we poison extremely few training samples. The Trojaned model only experienced
20 thousand poisoned samples across all 80 million training samples (0.025%)
– with so few poisoned samples in the training set, the poisoned samples fail
to form an cluster independent of clean samples. Further complicating matters,
it appears that our model appears to select the target action for two different
reasons. In other words, the assumption that the network selects each action
for a single reason when the input is clean does not hold. In fact, even when
large quantities of poisoned samples are present in the training set (10%), the
poisoned samples are clustered within one of the clean clusters. The poisoned
samples do form their own cluster if K = 3, although this is something that
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we discovered only because we know which samples were poisoned; a realistic
defender would not be able to determine this in practice.
The most promising technique for defending against Trojaned models is Neu-
ral Cleanse [32] as it does not require access to the training data and as such
is applicable even against the strong attackers living under the Threat Model
1 regime. In Fig. 11 we show the output of Neural Cleanse on our Targeted-
Attacked Breakout model. A defender applying Neural Cleanse to this model
would arguably claim to have detected the attack trigger by visual inspection.
Since the authors of [32] do not consider untargeted attacks, i.e. multiple infected
labels with single triggers, we report the expected result that Neural Cleanse is
unable to detect the trigger in our Untargeted-Attacked model.
Fig. 11: (left) A poisoned state for the Breakout game; the trigger is the 3 × 3 patch
of pixels in the top left corner. (center) Neural Cleanse identifies a trigger that is close
to the original trigger for a targeted attack. (right) Neural Cleanse fails to identify
the original trigger for the untargeted attack; the four colors are used to illustrate the
different triggers identified by Neural Cleanse for each of the four actions in this game.
Through our attempts to adapt Trojaned classification network defense meth-
ods to Trojan DRL, we have identified several outstanding issues in the realm
of classification network defense that will in fact carry over to Trojaned DRL
networks. Untargeted attacks are difficult to defend against because untargeted
attack triggers induce a distribution over outputs, as shown in Fig. 8, an effect
that breaks the assumptions of Neural Cleanse. There is no demonstrated de-
fense for partial Trojans, where the trigger only corrupts a subset of the output
labels. Similarly, we have conceptualized intra-label partial Trojans, where only
a subset of a specific label can be corrupted to the target label by the trigger. To
the best of our knowledge, intra-label partial Trojans have not been previously
considered as an outstanding issue by any scholarship.
We also identify challenges unique to Trojaned DRL agents that are not
important in the context of Trojaned classification networks. RL agents are of-
tentimes used as controllers in a dynamical system. In the control setting, RL
models can be trained to have (potentially many) continuous control outputs.
We have not demonstrated Trojan attacks in this setting, though we believe it
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likely that such agents can be trained with a Trojan that compromises control
performance. This scenario will require entirely new defense techniques as all
known defenses rest on the basis of discrete outputs. Furthermore, we claim
that previous works promising defenses under Threat Model 2 are not effective
on Trojaned DRL agents as large training sets and small amount of poisoned
inputs inhibit the proper function of such techniques.
7 Conclusion
Our work suggests caution in deploying reinforcement learning in high-security
safety-critical applications where the training process is not restricted to a con-
trolled and secure environment. Continuous lifelong reinforcement learning ap-
proaches need to be made more resilient to adversarial attack before their de-
ployment to social or mission-critical applications where the learning algorithm
cannot be shielded from adversaries. We have presented a case against outsourced
training of DRL agents. Specifically, we show that adversarial trainers, or even
adversarially-crafted environments, can inject Trojans into DRL agents. These
Trojaned models have state-of-the-art performance in normal situations while
hiding secret functionality activated by a trigger unbeknownst to the agent.
Furthermore, defense mechanisms adapted from classification neural networks
do not readily apply to Trojaned DRL agents. In future work, we plan to study
Trojan attacks for DRL agents with continuous control outputs. We also mo-
tivate the advancement of defense mechanims, noting that no existing defense
extends to the anticipated vulnerability in DRL agents with continuous outputs.
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